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Data Verification in Integrated RFID Systems
Kazuya Sakai, Member, IEEE, Min-Te Sun , Member, IEEE, Wei-Shinn Ku, Senior Member, IEEE,
Hua Lu , Senior Member, IEEE, and Ten H. Lai
Abstract—Radio frequency identification (RFID) is widely used
as a tagging system to facilitate physical transactions in the real
world. Thanks to the availability of inexpensive passive RF tags,
RFID technology is now the catalyst of Internet of Things, i.e., ev-
ery object can be uniquely identified in an Internet-like way. In the
future, many individual RFID systems are likely to be integrated
into a few exascale RFID systems. In an integrated RFID system,
service providers (SPs) that offer RFID-based data service and
clients that use the data service are different organizations. As a
consequence, quality of data in terms of authenticity is of significant
concern. In this paper, we first formulate a data verification prob-
lem in RFID systems and build a model of integrated RFID systems
where multiple SPs and clients exist. Then, we propose two data
verification protocols to ensure data generated by SPs associated
with a particular tag and has not been modified. In addition, we
implement our system as a prototype. The computer simulations,
analyses, and testbeds based on the prototype all demonstrate that
the proposed verifiable integrated RFID system achieves a high
level of security and performance.
Index Terms—Data security, radio frequency identification,
RFID tags.
I. INTRODUCTION
RADIO frequency identification (RFID) has emerged as anelectronic tagging technology, where RF tags are used
as the unique identifier of objects. Its wide adoption signifi-
cantly reduces the cost of inventory management and facilitates
a number of transactions in the physical world, such as library
management [1], indoor localization [2], [3], warehouse oper-
ations [4], and so on. In addition, RFID technologies serve on
the catalyst of the Internet of Things (IoTs), where a unique ID
is assigned to every object in the physical world. The key to the
success of RFID technology is the availability of inexpensive
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passive RF tags. Although passive tags do not have a power
source, they can be energized by signals from RF readers and
are capable of simple computations, e.g., 16-bit pseudorandom
generator, a collision resistant hash function, etc.
While RFID drives a number of personal and business ap-
plications, security and privacy threats are always a concern
for individuals and organizations. Hence, many studies have
been devoted to an RF reader securely obtaining tag IDs by
private authentications [5]–[7], jamming-based private authen-
tications [8], [9], secure grouping protocols [10], [11], and to
verifying an owner’s credential by a motion signature [12] or tag
activation [13]. A securely obtained tag ID is used as a pointer
to the data entry in the back-end server. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no study on the authenticity of data.
Therefore, we are interested in the data verification problem in
RFID systems.
In RFID systems, the back-end database server stores the
information about objects or information generated based on
objects’ status. Thus, any piece of data is associated with a
particular tag. A set of data DT = {d1 , d2 , . . . , di} associated
with Tag T is said to be verifiable if it can be proved that
DT is the information about the object referred by T and any
element of DT cannot be modified without being detected by the
owner of T . Therefore, we first formulate the formal definition
of the data verification problem in RFID systems as follows: A
challenger provides data set DT associated with Tag T , and a
verifier can verify that all elements in DT are associated with
T and none of them are modified.
One of the applications is an integrated RFID system. At
present, different RFID systems use different tagging systems.
However, individual RFID systems may converge into only a
few single tagging systems in the near future. In an integrated
RFID system, RFID technology is not only an identification
system, but also the source of valuable information. In other
words, an RFID system generates a huge amount of sensitive
data by reading tags.
The advantages of integrated RFID systems are as follows.
1) Integrating multiple RFID systems into an exascale sys-
tem reduces the operational cost and hardware cost for
tag-deploying organizations. At present, it is common for
an item to have multiple tags attached, each from a differ-
ent organization, and each of these organizations keeps an
entry in their own database for the item. If these RFID sys-
tems are integrated, only a single tag and a single database
will be required to track an item.
2) An integrated RFID system realizes a variant of the real-
name system, where any user/object must register an
1937-9234 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Fig. 1. Example of a tagging system, where multiple tags are attached to an
item.
account on a blog, website, or social service with her/its
real name. For instance, Facebook [14] does not allow one
person to have multiple accounts under different e-mails.
Having every object in the world associate with a single
tag could provide identification credential of objects to
RFID-based data services.
For example, the warehouse as well as the carrier company
manages their shipments via RF tags. Consider the scenario
that a warehouse ships a box to a customer or another branch
via a ground transportation service. Two tagging systems are
involved as shown in Fig. 1. One is the RFID-based inventory
management system in the warehouse labeled by T1 ; the other is
the system employed by the carrier, which attaches a tag to each
box for delivery services labeled by T2 . In an integrated RFID
system, only one tagging system exists. In other words, a single
tag for a box is shared by the inventory system and the carrier.
Although integrating multiple RFID systems into an exascale
system has advantages, the authenticity of data is of concern,
since users and providers of RFID-based data may belong to dif-
ferent organizations. Thus, the data verification problem must
be addressed. To construct a verifiable integrated RFID sys-
tem, in this paper, we propose two data verification protocols
to ensure the authenticity of the data, which are generated by
semitrusted organizations. Note that semitrusted model is gen-
erally used in cloud-based services [15], [16]. The proposed
integrated RFID system is similar to cloud-based services in
the sense that data are generated and maintained by service
providers (SPs), and these SPs follow the prescribed protocol
and do not collude. To validate the performance and the level
of security of the proposed verifiable integrated RFID system,
numerical analyses and computer simulations have been con-
ducted. To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed verifiable
integrated RFID system, a prototype as well as testbeds based
on the prototype have been built. Specifically, the contributions
of this paper are as follows.
1) We define the data verification problem in RFID systems.
2) We model an integrated RFID system architecture, where
the ownership of RF tags remains but other organizations
can read these tags and generate valuable information.
3) We propose a data verification protocol, called 1-1 proto-
col, for the verifiable RFID system to ensure the authen-
ticity of data generated by SPs.
4) We generalize the proposed data verification protocol into
the m-n protocol, where m clients and n SPs exist. The
proposed general model is practical in terms of key storage
cost and computational cost in each party.
5) We implement a prototype of the m-n protocol, and com-
plete testbeds to demonstrate the feasibility of the verifi-
able RFID system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related works
are studied in Section II. In Section III, verifiable integrated
RFID system architecture is introduced. We propose data ver-
ification protocols for integrated RFID systems in Section IV.
In Section V, we conduct valid data rate analyses and computa-
tional cost analyses of the proposed data verification protocols.
The performance of the proposed system is evaluated by com-
puter simulations in Section VI and by testbeds in Section VII.
In Section VIII, we provide our conclusion and suggest a few
possible future directions of this research.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of data verification in integrated RFID sys-
tems is related to verifiable database systems. In general, for
a query from a client, the server provides data and its proof (i.e.,
the authenticator of the data). A database is said to be verifi-
able if a client can check that his/her data in the untrustworthy
database server is correct in the sense that any other party cannot
add/delete/modify his/her data without being detected. As au-
thenticated data structures, Merkle tree [17], distributed Merkle
tree [18], one-way accumulators [19], skip-lists [20], and hash
tables [21] are widely used. For example, in the tree-based ap-
proach, data records in the database are mapped to leaf nodes
and each node maintains the authenticator for a data record.
Requirements of data verification are different from appli-
cation to application. In some database systems, data records
should be stored in a nonerasable and nonrewritable format
to establish the irrefutable proof and accurate details of past
events [22]. Li et al. [23] proposed a Merkle hash tree-based
data retention and verification mechanism with write-once and
read-many properties in rewritable storage media. In their tree
structure, the authenticator of the root is directory updated with-
out the authenticator of internal nodes when a leaf node is up-
dated due to data addition.
On the other hand, in cloud computing environments, it is
natural for a client to update data in a server. Banabbas et al. [24]
developed a verifiable computation scheme that allows a client
to efficiently update data and its proof in the database server. In
verifiable data streaming [25], the order of streamed data (e.g.,
a client streams data to a storage server) is considered, and data
verification is guaranteed in the database with an unbounded
size.
The data verification problem in RFID-based databases is
somewhat similar to verifiable database systems, but different
due to the following reasons. First, an integrated RFID system
has write-once and read-many properties. For clarification, the
write-once and read-many property is applied to the data entry
in database, but the tag’s memory is rewritable. Second, data
are generated by reading tags, and the amount of data in the
database can increase exponentially. Third, the order of data
generated by an RFID system is of concern. In addition, the
data verification in RFID systems differs from general verifi-
able database systems in the definition of verifiability. Existing
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Fig. 2. System model of the proposed integrated RFID system.
verifiable database systems guarantee that the data entry in the
database is not modified without the permission of its client and
the index of the data entries being correct. In this research, the
verifiability is defined in the sense that each data entry in the
database is associated with a particular tag.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Integrated RFID Architecture
As we discussed in the aforementioned warehouse example,
different RFID systems use different tag population at present.
Thus, a single object may have multiple tags during its life cycle
labeled by different organizations, i.e., a warehouse and a car-
rier. Since objects with a tag are uniquely identifiable (i.e., the
idea of the IoTs), in the near future, individual RFID systems
may converge into a single integrated exascale RFID system.
In the aforementioned example shown in Fig. 2, the warehouse
has the ownership of the box and the tag, and each carrier
generates data by reading the tag during the delivery service.
In other words, a single tagging system exists between two
different RFID applications. This proposed architecture sig-
nificantly reduces the operational and hardware cost for tag
deployment.
In our verifiable RFID systems, two kinds of parties exist,
clients and SPs. A client is an organization that owns objects with
an RF tag, such as supermarkets and warehouses. A client has its
own RFID systems for inventory management purposes. During
supply chain, its products are processed and managed by other
organizations, called SPs. An SP is a semitrusted organization
that reads RF tags, generates data, and stores tags’ information
in its database. Thus, the organization that owns objects with
a tag is a client with respect to the organization that provides
information service by reading these tags and generating data.
The system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. In this figure,
there are two SPs (Service Provider 1 and Service Provider 2).
Each SP has its database, denoted by DB, and a number of
readers, denoted by R. Tag T owned by the client is read by Ri
(1 ≤ i ≤ 8) during the delivery process of these SPs, and data
di is generated in every tag access.
An organization could be either a client or an SP for a particu-
lar tag population. In addition, many organizations are involved
in an integrated RFID system. Thus, for particular tag popula-
tions, we define the m-client and n-SP model, where each client
has a number of tags and they are processed by SPs.
B. Data Verification Problem
The data verification is a process to ensure the authenticity
of data. Particularly, in RFID systems, the data stored in the
back-end server is the information about objects or information
generated based on objects’ status. Thus, any piece of data is as-
sociated with a particular tag. In a traditional RFID system, tags
are read and generated data is used by the same organization. An
organization can always ensure that data generated by reading
tags are associated with a particular tag. Thus, the authenticity
of generated data has not been of concern. However, when it
comes to integrated RFID systems, clients and SPs are different
organizations. Therefore, the clients must be able to ensure the
authenticity of data provided by SPs.
The authenticity of data is defined as the verifiability. A set of
data DT = {d1 , d2 , . . . , di} associated with Tag T is said to be
verifiable, if we can prove that DT is the information about the
object referred by T and any element of DT cannot be modified
without being detected. An integrated RFID system is said to be
verifiable if a client can verify the authenticity of any data set
DT generated by SPs, where T is any tag that the client owns.
C. Assumptions
In addition to passive RF tag functions defined by EPC Global
Gen 2 [26], tags are assumed to be able to execute the synchro-
nization command. That is, a tag is capable of computing a hash
value of a key and updating its key, i.e., Key←H(Key), where
Key is a key and H(.) is a collision resistant hash function. The
synchronization technique is used in many studies [27] to pre-
vent adversaries from tracking a tag. Thus, the tag’s memory
is assumed to be rewritable, which is a necessary condition to
provide security and privacy mechanisms in RFID systems.
An SP is semitrusted in the sense that the SP does not physi-
cally compromise tags. For example, as defined by EPC Global
Gen 2 [26], a tag has unreadable memory space by readers,
where access and kill passwords are stored. We assume an SP
neither changes the password of a tag nor kills a tag by physical
attacks. In addition, an SP is assumed not to send false data to
tags. Let us consider that a client, say a warehouse, ships a box
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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TABLE I
DEFINITION OF THE NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER
with a tag to a customer via a semitrusted ground transport SP.
Should the SP physically compromise or kill the tag, it will be
penalized by the law or hurt the credibility of the organization.
Hence, there is no motivation for the SP to do such things. How-
ever, the SP could generate data without reading tags or modify
information in its database. For example, it is common for mul-
tiple carriers, each with an RFID system, to be involved in a
single shipment as illustrated in Fig. 2. When an item is deliv-
ered using express mail, the carriers are given a strict schedule
to follow so that the item can be shipped to the customer on
time. In case of a shipment delay, the customer usually can get
his/her money back from the carrier responsible for the delay.
If no verification mechanism is provided, an SP (i.e., the carrier
who is responsible for the delay of the shipment) can change
the generated data of the tags in the database, then the customer
has no way of finding who is responsible for the delay.
The replies from tags may collide during interrogations,
which can be handled by collision avoidance mechanisms [28],
[29]. This paper focuses on the data verification protocol, in
which how to write data to tags and how to manage these data
are discussed. Therefore, we assume that the reader eventually
can access individual tags during the read/write process.
IV. DATA VERIFICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a data verification protocol for
verifiable integrated RFID systems. The notations used in this
paper are listed in Table I.
A. Overview of Data Verification Protocol
The data verification is achieved by exchanging signatures
between an SP and a tag. The proposed verification protocol
consists of three phases. The first phase is system initialization,
where the client generates two keys, a tag’s key TK and a
reader’s key RK. TK is assigned to a tag, and RK is assigned
to an SP. In addition, the client provides a counter C = 0 to
the SP. The second phase is data generation. In this stage, the
SP reads tags and generates data d. Based on RK, C, and d,
the SP computes a signature for data d, and by the query-and-
response, the tag also computes a signature and replies to the
SP. In the third phase, the client verifies the authenticity of the
data generated by the SP by the signature of the SP and tag.
First, we introduce the 1–1 protocol as a baseline for a simpli-
fied integrated RFID system, where one client and one SP exist.
Then, we will propose a practical data verification protocol for
the m-client and n-SP model for arbitrary m and n values.
B. 1–1 Protocol
In the 1-client and 1-SP model, one client and one SP ex-
ist. The 1–1 protocol for the data verification in this simplified
model consists of three phases, which is elaborated in the fol-
lowing sections.
1) System Initialization: The client initializes the system by
assigning a key TK for tags and RK for the SP. In addition, the
client provides a counter C with initial value 0 to the SP. The
tag’s secret key TK is stored in unreadable memory space in
the tag, and thus the SP cannot obtain TK from a tag unless it
physically compromises the tag.
2) Data Generation: When SP accesses T , an RF reader
is involved in the communication. For simplicity, we just say
SP sends a query to T , T replies to SP , and so on. In the
data generation phase, both SP and T generate a signature
for the data verification. RK and TK are used to compute a
signature, and for each interrogation, both RK and TK are
updated by the synch command. Note that in the literature [27],
the synchronization command is used to update the common
secret between a reader and a tag, hence the name is synch. RKi
and TKi are computed by applying a hash function i times, and
the bases are RK0 = RK and TK0 = TK.
For each interrogation, SP reads Tag T and generates di ,
which is the ith data associated with T . SP chooses a random
number Nr,i and computes a signature πi for di . Note that the
use of random numbers prevents the replay attack, in which an
adversary clones a tag’s reply seen before. πi is obtained by
a hash function H(RKi, di ||C||Nr,i), where || represents the
concatenation of two binary strings. Then, SP sends πi and Nr,i
to T . On receiving a query, T also generates a random number
Nt,i and computes a signature σi by H(TKi, ID||πi ||Nr,i),
where ID is T ’s identifier. Then, T sends σi and Nt,i to SP . On
receiving T ’s replay, SP stores data di and the proof (πi , σi , C,
Nr,i , Nt,i) to the database. SP updates the key by RKi+1 ←
H(RKi), and increments the counter by 1, i.e., C ← C + 1.
Finally, SP sends the synch command to T . With the synch
command, T computes TKi+1 ← H(TKi) and stores TKi+1
in the memory. Note that the old key is overwritten and replaced
by the new key. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
3) Data Verification: In the data verification phase, Client
V obtains data DT from SP and verifies the data authenticity
in terms that all data in DT are associated with Tag T . Should
SP modify any data or add data without reading T , V is able to
detect.
First note that V knows the RK, TK, and ID of T . V requests
the ith data of T , and SP replies with di and its proof (πi ,
σi , C, Nr,i , Nt,i). Based on the counter C, V computes the
keys RK ′i and TK
′
i by applying H(RK) and H(TK) i times,
respectively. With these keys, V computes two signatures π′i by
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H(RK ′i , di ||C||Nr,i) and σ′i by H(TK ′i , ID||πi ||Nr,i). Then,
V checks whether π′i equals πi and σ
′
i equals σi . If so, di is
valid. Otherwise, di is invalid. The pseudocode is provided in
Algorithm 2.
C. m-n Protocol
In this section, we propose the m-n protocol for data ver-
ification in the m-client and n-SP model. Let Vi be Client i,
and SPj be SP j. Assume each client Vi owns lVi tags, and
these tags could be processed by all SPs. The straightforward
approach based on the 1–1 protocol requires the key storage cost
of n× lVi for clients, n for tags, and
∑m
i=0 lVi for SPs. This is
because the key and counter are different for each SP. Thus, this
approach is impossible, since tags can store only a few keys due
to the storage constraint. For instance, in EPC Global Gen 2,
32-bit keys are used, and a tag normally has less than 512 bits
memory space.
Hence, we propose the m-n data verification protocol with the
key storage costs of n + lVi for clients, 1 for tags, and m for SPs,
respectively. The proposed protocol consists of three phases,
system initialization, data generation, and data verification.
1) System Initialization: Let RKj,i be the key assigned by a
client V to compute the signature for the ith data dj,i generated
by SPj . For data dj,i associated with T owned by V , Client
V must be able to compute the corresponding TKk and RKj,i
from TK and RK. Note that the number of synchronization
commands applied to RKj,i and TKk is different, since a
number of SPs may read Tag T . Hence, in addition to SPs, each
tag T needs to keep a counter CT .
Each client, say Vi , generates RKj,0 for each SP SPj , and
TK0 for each tag T . In addition, V initializes the counter CSPj
to be 0 for each SPj and the counter CT for each T . Thus, Client
Vi stores n + lVi keys, SP SPj stores m keys and m counters,
and Tag T of any client stores one key and one counter.
2) Data Generation: In the m-n protocol, Tag T owned by
Client V will be processed by a number of SPs, say SPj . The
counter CT and CSPj for all SPs that generated data from T are
incremented. Thus, we have CT =
∑
∀SPj CSPj as long as all
the SP obeys the protocol.
Let Dj,T = {dj,1 , dj,2 , . . . , dj,i} be the data set generated
by SPj and associated with T . Similar to the 1-client and
1-SP model, SPj generates the ith data dj,i , generates a ran-
dom number, and computes a signature πj,i by using RKj,i ,
CSPj , and Nr,i . Then, SPj sends the signature and the random
number to Tag T . When the tag creates a signature, it incorpo-
rates its counter CT . The counter value will be CT = k, where
k =
∑
j CSPj for all SPj that reads T so far. On receiving the
signature σi , the counter CT , and Nt,i , SPj stores data di and
its proof (πj,i , σk , CSPj , CT , Nr,i , Nt,i). Finally, SPj and T
update their key and counter. The pseudocode is provided in
Algorithm 3.
3) Data Verification: In the m-n protocol, Client V obtains
the ith data dj,i and its signature from SPj . Since each SP
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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updates its secret key and counter independently, even if one of
the SPs adds or modifies data without reading a tag, other SPs
are intact.
In the data verification protocol, V first requests the ith data
associated with T to SPj , and then SPj returns dj,i and (πj,i ,
σi, CSPj , CT ,Nr,i , Nt,k ). V computes the corresponding keys
RK ′j,i for π
′
j,i and TKk for σk by applying the hash function
CSPj and CT times, respectively. Here, k is the number of reads
by SPs, i.e., k =
∑
∀ SPj CSPj . If π
′
j,i = πj,i and σ
′
k = σk , then
the data dj,i is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. The pseudocode is
provided in Algorithm 4.
D. Optimization
To verify the authenticity of data, a client must compute a
number of hash functions, which may take a long time. Let
Nd be the number of data generated from a tag. A client can
request the ith data generated by the jth SP, and ij <= Nd
always holds. Without the key caching, i× j computations
are required for each data verification. To save the com-
putational cost, we propose an optimization mechanism by
means of the key caching. Our key caching mechanism min-
imizes the computational cost with a bounded size of key
caching.
Let S be a set of keys and Smax be the number of keys that
will be stored at a client for each tag. The current cache size is
denoted as |S|. If |S| < Smax , a client simply stores the current
key in the cache. When |S| = Smax , the client needs to discard
the current key after data verification or replace an existing
key with the new one. Note that |S| > Smax should not happen
because Smax is the bounded size of the cache.
Each key in S corresponds to the ith data generated by the
jth SP in some ways. We define the distance between two
keys, d(key1 , key2), as the number of computations to ob-
tain key2 from key1 by a hash function H(.). That is, key2
is obtained by applying the hash function d(key1 , key2) times.
If key2 cannot be obtained from key1 , d(key1 , key2) =∞.
Let X be the random variable defined as d(sk , key), where
key is the current key and sk is in S. Our goal is to mini-
mize
∑Nd
i=1
X
i . This can be done by scanning all keys in the
cache. Note that the cache size is considered as a constant, as
the cache size is normally very small compared to a sampling
population.
If two keys key1 and key2 are valid, d(key1 , key2) can sim-
ply be computed by i2j2 − i1j1 , where key1 is the i1 th data
generated by the j1 th SP and key2 is the i2 th data gener-
ated by the j2 th SP. Assume kth element in S (1 ≤ k ≤ |S|)
is the key for ik th data generated by jk th SP. In the pro-
posed optimization mechanism, we first add a new key to S.
Since S contains |S|+ 1 keys at this time, we will remove
one of the keys in S so that
∑Nd
i=1
X
i
is minimized. To opti-
mize the computational cost, we need to find the kth key (1 ≤
k ≤ |S|) such that ik−1jk−1 − ik+1jk+1 is minimized, where
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i0j0 = 0 and i|S |+1j|S |+1 = Nd . Note that i1j1 may be i0j0 ,
and ik jk may be i|S |+1j|S |+1 . The pseudocode is provided in
Algorithm 5.
V. ANALYSES
A. Valid Data Rate Analyses Against Illegal Data Access
The valid data rate is an indicator to show how well a veri-
fication protocol protects tags’ data against potential malicious
SPs. Let psp be the probability that an SP is malicious, and pd be
the probability that a malicious SP illegally generates data, i.e.,
the SP does not obey the verifiable tag access protocol when it
generates data. We denote the average number of data generated
for a tag as Nd and the number of SPs that process a tag as Nsp .
First, we analyze the valid data rate for the 1–1 protocol. An
illegal data access indicates that a malicious SP does not obey
the protocol, and this causes the counters kept in SP and a tag not
to be synchronized. Thus, in the 1–1 protocol, once invalid data
are added to the data set, the other SPs cannot generate a valid
signature for data generation. Let X be the random variable that
the kth SP illegally accesses a tag first, and Y be the minimum
index of the invalid data generated by the kth SP. Since all of the
jth SPs (1 ≤ k ≤ X − 1) follow the protocol, all data generated
by the kth SP is valid. In addition, up to the (Y − 1)th data are
valid, but the Y th data are invalid. Thus, the valid data rate can
be formulated by
NrE[X] + E[Y ]
Nd
. (1)
For simplicity, Msp = Nsppsp and Md = Nrpd. The ex-
pected values of X and Y are computed by the following:
E[X] =
1
Nsp
Ns p∑
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Nsp
(
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Next, we analyze the valid data rate for the m-n protocol. In
this protocol, even though malicious SPs illegally access a tag,
data generated by other SPs are intact. Thus, the valid data rate
is independent of the random variable X . We deduce (4) for the
valid data rate of the data verification protocol:
1−Nsppsp + E[Y ]
Nr
Nsppsp . (4)
B. Analyses of Computational Cost
We build an analytical model of the number of executions of
a hash function in a data verification protocol. Without a key
caching mechanism, a client must compute the corresponding
key for a tag and an SP from the current keys. To analyze the
computational cost, a random data access is considered.
Let Xc be the random variable that represents the distance
between a base key and the current key, and Xn be the random
variable that represents the distance between a base key and the
next key. Assuming both current key and next key are valid, the
number of computations can be obtained by Xn when Xn < Xc
and Xn −Xc when Xn > Xc . Since a client is assumed not to
request the same data, Xn = Xc should never happen. Thus, we
can derive the computation cost in
(Xc − 1)Xn
Nd
+
(Xd −Xc)(Xn −Xc)
Nd
. (5)
Next, we analyze the computational cost with the key caching.
In our caching mechanism, the index of keys in the cache is
uniformly distributed. Thus, given the size of the key cache
Smax , each pair of the closest keys in the cache is distanced
by approximately Nd/Smax . Therefore, the expected number of
hash function computations can be obtained by
1
Nd/Smax
Nd /Sm a x∑
k=1
k =
Nd/Smax − 1
2
. (6)
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We conducted computer simulations to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed data verification protocols, the 1–1 proto-
col and m–n protocol, along with the tree-based protocols [23].
A. Simulation Configurations
The integrated RFID system consists of 10 to 100 clients and
SPs. Each client has 4096 tags, and each tag is processed by
multiple SPs. Each SP reads a tag and generates data 10 to 100
times. Around 10% to 90% of SPs are malicious and they add
data without reading a tag with probability p. The value of p
ranges from 0.1 to 0.9. As attack models, illegal data access
and illegal data modification are considered. The illegal data
addition, where a malicious SP adds data without reading a tag,
causes the signatures for subsequent data to be invalid. In the
illegal data modification attack, a malicious SP modifies existing
data entry in the database. For each tag, ten SPs are randomly
selected that read the tag and generate data during its life cycle.
In total, 1000 system realizations are generated and the average
is taken as simulation results. The simulation parameters are
shown in Table II.
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TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Fig. 3. Average key storage cost of each client for the different numbers of
SPs and tags.
In this performance evaluation, the following metrics are
considered.
1) Valid Data Rate—During the life cycle of a tag, SPs gener-
ate data including invalid data. A client randomly accesses
data on an SP, and the proof for the data may or may not
be valid. Valid data rate is defined as the number of data
with valid proof divided by the number of data accesses.
2) Number of Keys—As key storage cost, the number of keys
in the system is employed, including SP and tag keys that
each organization (i.e., client or SP) maintains.
3) Computational Cost—A client has to compute the cor-
responding keys from the base RK and TK in the data
verification phase. The number of hash functions applied
to obtain the keys is used as computational cost.
B. Analytical Results
Fig. 3 demonstrates the key storage cost of each client with
respect to the number of SPs. From analyses, it is clear that a
client maintains n + lV on average in the m–n protocol. Here,
n is the number of SPs and lV is the average number of tags that
clients own. On the other hand, the 1–1 protocol incurs n× lV
keys cost.
Fig. 4 shows the key storage cost of each SP with respect to
the number of clients. Theoretically, an SP keeps
∑m
i=0 lVi keys
on average in the 1–1 protocol and m keys on average in the
m–n protocol, where m is the number of clients. As shown in
Figs. 3 and 4, the m–n protocol significantly reduces the key
storage cost as indicated by the analyses.
Fig. 5 depicts the key storage cost with respect to the number
of tags in the system. In this configuration, there are 100 clients
and SPs. For the 1–1 protocol, each client and SP maintains the
same number of keys, as the number of keys depends on the
Fig. 4. Average key storage cost of each SP for the different numbers of clients
and tags.
Fig. 5. Average key storage cost of an SP and a client for different number of
tags.
Fig. 6. Valid data rate for different illegal access rates.
total number of tags in the system. With the same reasons for
Figs. 3 and 4, the storage cost per client (or per SP) with the
m–n protocol is much smaller than that with the 1–1 protocol.
C. Simulation Results
Fig. 6 illustrates the valid data rate for the illegal data access
attack with respect to illegal data access rate. As can be seen in
the figure, even when the illegal access rate is 0.9, at least 90%
of data has a valid proof in the m–n protocol and the tree-based
protocol. This is because SP and tag independently update their
key and counter. Hence, illegal data access affects signatures
computed for data generated by one SP, and other data and its
proof are intact. On the other hand, in the 1–1 protocol, once
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Fig. 7. Valid data rate under the illegal data access attack for different per-
centage of malicious SPs.
Fig. 8. Valid data rate for different data modification rates.
an SP adds data without reading a tag, all data generated after
illegal access has invalid proof. As a result, the 1–1 protocol has
poor valid data rate.
Fig. 7 presents the valid data rate for an illegal data access
attack with respect to the percentage of malicious SPs. In this
configuration, the percentage of malicious SPs ranges from 10%
to 90%, and each malicious SP illegally adds data with a prob-
ability of 10%. In the tree-based protocol, once a malicious
SP adds data without reading a tag, it updates the signature
for all internal nodes in the key tree. This causes a client not
to access any data located in the tree. Hence, the valid data
rate in the tree-based protocol drastically decreases according
to the percentage of malicious SPs. With the same reason as
Fig. 6, the 1–1 protocol results in poor performance even when
there are only a few malicious SPs. From Figs. 6 and 7, it is
clear that the proposed m–n protocol is more reliable than other
protocols.
Fig. 8 shows the valid data rate for the data modification
attack with respect to the data modification rate. Note that the
1–1 protocol and the m–n protocol has the same performance
against the data modification attack, and thus we omit the 1–1
protocol. In this setting, 10% of SPs are malicious and modify
existing data for a tag. In the m–n protocol, only modified data
are affected, and thus the valid data rate linearly decreases as the
illegal data modification rate increases. On the other hand, in
the tree-based protocol, all signatures are updated in the internal
Fig. 9. Valid data rate under the data modification attack for different percent-
age of malicious SPs.
Fig. 10. Computational cost for different number of data accesses.
nodes in the tree should one of its data for a tag be modified,
and hence a client cannot obtain a valid signature for any data
entry for the tag in the malicious SP.
Fig. 9 presents the valid data rate for the data modification
attack with respect to the percentage of malicious SPs. In this
scenario, 10% to 90% of SPs are malicious and each malicious
SP modifies 10% of data in its database. If data for a tag is
modified in a malicious SP, a client cannot access any data
for the tag. Thus, the valid data rate of the tree-based protocol
decreases as the percentage of malicious SPs increases. On the
other hand, our m–n protocol results in high valid data rate,
since only modified data is affected and others are intact.
Fig. 10 shows the computational cost with respect to the num-
ber of data accesses for a particular tag. In this scenario, a client
requests ith data from jth SP that processes the client’s tag,
where i and j are randomly selected. Without the key caching,
the client must compute the corresponding keys from the base
keys for each data verification, which causes heavy computa-
tional cost. By the key caching mechanism, the computational
cost is alleviated by 90% as shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 11 presents the computational cost with respect to the
number of data generated by each SP. From this figure, we can
see the key caching reduces 60% of computations compared
with the m–n protocol. Though the computational cost linearly
increases as the number of generated data increases, the key
caching is still effective.
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Fig. 11. Computational cost for different number of data entries.
Fig. 12. Program modules of the client and server.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTBEDS
We have implemented a prototype of the m–n protocol to
demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed data verification
scheme in an integrated RFID system.
The prototype consists of a number of modules. The inter-
actions between different modules are shown in Fig. 12. The
system consists of the client side and server side modules. Both
the client and server have setup, data verification, and RF in-
terface modules. The setup module initializes an SP with the
secret key and a counter. The data verification module is an
implementation of Algorithm 4. The RF interface module is the
program of an RF reader. At the client side, the RF interface
module initializes the key and a counter of a tag. On the other
hand, at the server side, RF interface reads a tag and executes
the synchronization command. In addition, the client module
has GUI.
A. Testbed Environment
The testbed is composed of two computers, since the verifica-
tion process is conducted between a client and a server. One of
the computers acts as the client; the other is the server (an SP).
The data generated by an SP when it reads a tag is application
dependent. Thus, in this testbed, the server module generates
bulk information, such as “SP reads Tag 1 at 10:00 pm.” In this
testbed, we conducted two kinds of experiments as follows:
1) Client-Server Tests—In this testbeds, we will show that
the proposed verification protocols are feasible in real
network settings. To this end, three kinds of network con-
figurations, the loop-back, LAN, and WAN accesses, are
Fig. 13. Turn around time with the loop-back setting, where the client and
server programs run in the same host.
considered. In the loop-back configuration, both the client
and server programs are executed in the same computer
(MacBook Air), and the client program accesses the server
program through the loop-back address, i.e., 127.0.0.1.
The client (SP) computer acts as different clients (SPs)
at different times, so that the m–n model is simulated.
For the LAN setting, a Windows PC is used as a server
in IEEE 802.11g wireless LAN controlled by a wireless
broadband router (Linksys WRT54GL). In the WAN sce-
nario, the server (Ubuntu PC) is located in National Cen-
tral University, Taiwan, and the client accesses the server
from The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA.
Experiments are conducted each hour in a day, and the
average of each hour was computed. In all of the settings,
MacBook Air is used as a client.
2) Reader-Tag Tests—In the proposed data verification sys-
tem, read and write operations are performed during the
data generation and data verification phases. In a read op-
eration, an RF reader simply accesses a tag’s content. On
the contrary, in a write operation, a tag computes a hash
function to synchronize the key and counter with an SP,
as shown at the end of Algorithm 1 and 3. As an RFID
system, we employ Motorola MC319Z [30] and passive
tags.
Since the purpose of this testbed is to show the feasibility
of our verifiable RFID system, the response time is considered.
The response time is defined as the required time for a client
to request data and verify its authenticity, and for an RF reader
to complete a read/write operation. For each configuration, 100
experiments are performed, and the average values are collected
as the results. Note that the system initialization is an offline
process. Hence, we conducted several rounds of the testbed
experiment to measure the performance of the online processes.
B. Client-Server Testbed Results
Fig. 13 illustrates the response time (ms) for the loop-back
setting with respect to the number of data entries in the server.
Since only one SP exists in this testbed, the number of data
entries for a tag is set to be up to 1000. Comp. cost and Comp.
cost w/ caching refer to the required time to compute the hash
value from the base key, which does not contain the network-
related delay. As shown in the figure, the response time increases
as the number of data entries increases. This is because more
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Fig. 14. Response time with LAN and WAN settings (in the WAN setting, the
client host is located in Japan and the server is located in Taiwan).
Fig. 15. Response time for different hours with the WAN setting.
data in the server implies that the client needs to apply the
hash function more times to the base tag/SP keys for the proof.
According to Fig. 13, the data verification process does not take
much time. In addition, the key caching mechanism significantly
reduces the response time.
Fig. 14 presents the response time (ms) for the LAN and
WAN settings with respect to the number of data entries in the
server. For both the LAN and WAN configurations, the key
caching slightly reduces the response time, but the reduction is
not significant. This implies that the response time with the data
verification is mostly dominated by the network delay. There-
fore, we can conclude that the computational delay introduced
from the m–n protocol is very small, and the data verification
in an integrated RFID system is feasible for real deployment in
terms of the computational cost.
Fig. 15 shows the average response time (ms) for a WAN
setting with respect to each hour of a day. The number of data
entries is set to be 1000. The experiments had started at 12 a.m.
on Mar 5, 2014 in the local time in the United States, and
ended at 11 p.m. on the same day. As can be seen from the
figure, the response times are different from time to time in a
day. Particularly, the experiments at noon result in the slowest
response time. However, the difference is not significant, since
the response time is the order of milliseconds.
C. Reader-Tag Testbeds Result
Fig. 16 demonstrates the probability distribution function and
cumulative distribution function of read and write operations
time (ms). From the figure, we can say that most read and write
operations are completed within 0.5 and 2.0 ms, respectively.
On average, read operations take 0.384 s, and write operations
Fig. 16. Required time of read and write operations with Motorola MC319Z.
take 1.46 s. Therefore, the proposed data verification protocol
is feasible with a real RFID system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy in RFID systems are some of the most
significant concerns when we deploy RFID applications to the
real world. While many RFID applications are deployed at
present, those individual systems use different tagging systems.
In the age of IoTs, individual RFID systems are merged into
a few exascale RFID systems and use a single tagging system.
In such a system, the authenticity of data must be addressed to
improve the quality of RFID-based data service.
In this paper, we first propose an integrated RFID system,
where a number of organizations are involved and a single tag-
ging system exists. Then, we formulate the data verification
problem, in which RFID-based data are verifiable in the sense
that data are associated with a particular tag. To achieve this,
we design two verification protocols, the 1–1 and the m–n pro-
tocols. To measure the degree of security and performance of
our verifiable integrated RFID system, analytical models are
built and computer simulations are conducted. In addition, we
have implemented a prototype of the m–n model. From the
testbeds for different network configurations, we conclude that
the proposed verifiable RFID system is highly feasible.
For simplicity, we assume that each SP has one secret key.
In the future, we plan to extend our work so that each SP is
allowed to have multiple secret keys so that each branch of the
SP has one secret key. In addition, there are other extended
directions to this research. First, the scalability issue should
be addressed when a large number of clients and SPs join the
system. Second, the computational cost in the data generation
and data verification processes could be further improved using
a structured key management. Finally, we may extend our
proposed system to limit the lifetime of tags’ data based on the
number of times tags are accessed.
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